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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
This case comes to the Idaho Supreme Court as a certified question of law from the Unit-
ed States District Court for the District of Idaho. 
II. Statement of the Facts 
Pursuant to the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the State of Idaho is 
obligated to provide medical care to its prisoners. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).1 
Within the State of Idaho, the authority to control, direct, and manage correctional facilities is 
granted to the State Board of Correction. I.C. § 20-209(1).2 The obligation to provide for the 
care, maintenance, and employment of all prisoners is also delegated to the State Board of Cor-
rection. Id. 3 The State Board of Correction has "the authority to enter into contracts with private 
prison contractors" to meet this statutory obligation. LC. § 20-209(3).4 The State Board of Cor-
rection, along with the Commission of Pardons and Parole, make up the Idaho Department of 
Correction ("IDOC"). I.C. § 20-201. "[T]he State Board of Correction exercises its constitutional 
and statutory authority through the instrumentality of the Department of Correction." Idaho De-
1 See also R. Vol. 2, p. 441 (IDOC's Request for Proposal states: "The IDOC is responsible for 
the care and supervision of adult incarcerated Offenders under the IDOC's jurisdiction. An ele-
ment of that duty includes the provision of healthcare and mental health services to Off enders in 
correctional facilities and community work centers."). 
2 See also R. Vol. 1, p. 64 (Memorandum in Support of Joint Motion to Certify Question of Law 
to the Idaho Supreme Court (hereinafter "Stipulated Memorandum")). 
3 See also id. 
4 See also id. 
4 
partment of Correction v. Anderson, 134 Idaho 680, 690, 8 P.3d 675, 685 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing 
LC. § 20-201(3)). 
Corizon LLC ("Corizon") is in the business of providing privatized correctional health 
care services.5 Corizon's corporate office is in Tennessee and its operational headquarters is in 
Missouri.6 Corizon is a privately-held, for-profit entity.7 Since 2005, Corizon has contracted with 
IDOC to provide health care to Idaho prisoners. 8 
Pocatello Women's Correctional Center ("PWCC"), located in Pocatello, Idaho, is a cor-
rectional facility under IDOC's control, direction, and management.9 Under its contract with 
IDOC, Corizon is responsible for the medical care of the prisoners within PWCC.10 
5 R. Vol. 1, p. 65 (Stipulated Memorandum). 
6 R. Vol. 1, p. 151 (Corizon's Technical Proposal states: "Corizon has the most comprehensive 
sophisticated corporate office in the industry ... 'Back shop' business tasks are handled in our 
corporate office in Brentwood, Tennessee and our operational headquarters in St. Louis, Mis-
souri."). 
7 R. Vol. 1, p. 97 (Corizon's Technical Proposal states: "Corizon, Inc. is a corporation, incorpo-
rated in the State of Missouri, operating as a privately held, for-profit entity."). See also, e.g., 
Pena v. Corizon, No. 1:11-cv-00366-BLW, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30451, at *1-2, 2016 WL 
901573 (D. Idaho Mar. 9, 2016) ("Corizon is a private corporation which is under contract to 
provide medical services to inmates in the custody of certain IDOC facilities."); Vitale v. Song, 
No. 1 :13-cv-00326-BLW, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129300, at *19 (D. Idaho Sep. 21, 2016) 
("[T]he Idaho Department of Correction contracted with Corizon, a private corporation, to pro-
vide medical services for a number of IDOC facilities."). 
8 R. Vol. 1, p. 101 (Corizon's Technical Proposal states: "Corizon has had the privilege to serve 
as the Idaho Department of Correction (IDOC) healthcare partner since 2005."). 
9 R. Vol. 1, p. 67 (Stipulated Memorandum). 
IO Id. 
5 
Pocatello Hospital LLC d/b/a Portneuf Medical Center ("PMC") is a hospital located in 
Pocatello, Idaho. 11 Corizon often brings prisoners from PWCC to PMC for medical care. 12 PMC 
directly bills Corizon for medical care rendered to those prisoners. 13 
On January 1, 2011, Corizon and PMC entered into a Hospital Services Agreement 
("HSA"). 14 As part of the written agreement, Corizon engaged PMC to provide hospitalization 
and inpatient and outpatient medical care to prisoners within Corizon' s care. 15 Under the HSA, 
Corizon agreed to pay PMC a contractual reimbursement rate ("HSA Rate") for the medical care 
provided by PMC to the prisoners.16 Corizon paid the HSA Rate under the terms of the HSA. 
The HSA Rate was a discounted rate from PMC's regular billing. 
Corizon's contract with IDOC was expiring. As a result, on July 30, 2013, IDOC issued a 
Request for Proposal ("RFP"). 17 The RFP sought "an expert Contractor to provide healthcare, 
mental health, dental, vision, specialty care, and pharmaceutical services" to prisoners incarcer-
ated within the State of Idaho's correctional system. 18 On September 30, 2013, Corizon submit-
ted a proposal by sealed bid. 19 Corizon's proposal was accepted.20 A new contract was executed 
between Corizon and IDOC, pursuant to which Corizon agreed to provide "Healthcare Services 






17 R. Vol. 2 & 3, pp. 432-652. See also R. Vol. 1, p. 64 (Stipulated Memorandum). 
18 R. Vol. 2, p. 361. See also R. Vol. 1, p. 64 (Stipulated Memorandum). 
19 R. Vol. 1 & 2, pp. 80-349 & 358-416. See also R. Vol. 1, p. 65 (Stipulated Memorandum). 
20 R. Vol. 1, p. 65 (Stipulated Memorandum). 
6 
for Adult Idaho Offenders for the Idaho Department of Correction.',21 The term of this new con-
tract was from January 1, 2014, through December 31, 2018, with the option for two additional 
two-year extensions.22 
Corizon's new contract with IDOC was "a full risk contract" pursuant to which IDOC 
paid Corizon a fixed amount for each covered inmate, and Corizon agreed to assume all respon-
sibility, including all financial responsibility, for any medical care needed by the prisoners.23 
Specifically, under the new contract with IDOC, Corizon agreed that "[t]he contract resulting 
from this RFP to provide healthcare for Idaho Off enders is a full-risk contract" and that it would 
"be responsible for payment of all medical claims for Offenders" and to be "financially responsi-
ble for claims from subcontractors or other providers for services provided prior to contract expi-
ration. "24 Corizon also agreed to "be held responsible for the provision of healthcare as described 
herein, and to absorb costs through the duration of the contract and any renewal periods. [Cori-
zon] is responsible for any and all agreements with local healthcare providers, pharmacies, spe-
cialists, et al; and for developing efficiencies and controlling costs. "25 Corizon also agreed to 
21 R. Vol. 2, p. 431 (IDOC Contract Purchase Order). See also R. Vol. 1, p. 65 (Stipulated Mem-
orandum). 
22 R. Vol. 2, p. 431 (IDOC Contract Purchase Order). See also R. Vol. 1, p. 65 (Stipulated Mem-
orandum). 
23 R. Vol. 3, p. 452 ("The contract resulting from this RFP to provide healthcare for Idaho Of-
fenders is a full-risk contract."). 
24 R. Vol. 3, p. 452 & 520. See also R. Vol. 1, p. 65 (Stipulated Memorandum). 
25 R. Vol. 3, p. 452. See also R. Vol. 1, p. 65 (Stipulated Memorandum). 
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make "[a]ll payments to medical providers ... within thirty (30) calendar days of the Contractor's 
[i.e. Corizon's] receipt of the invoice."26 
On July 1, 2014, approximately six months after the initiation of Corizon's new contract 
with IDOC, Corizon began reimbursing PMC at a rate equal to the Idaho Medicaid reimburse-
ment rate instead of at the agreed upon HSA Rate. 27 The Idaho Medicaid reimbursement rate was 
far less than the HSA rate. PMC did not agree to a reduction of the contractual reimbursement 
rate. On September 29, 2015, Corizon provided written notice to PMC exercising its option to 
terminate the HSA without cause.28 Pursuant thereto, the HSA terminated on December 31, 
2015.29 
Since January 1, 2016, no contract has existed between Corizon and PMC with respect to 
the amount Corizon must pay to PMC for medical care rendered to prisoners. 30 Given the ab-
sence of a contract, it is PMC's position that Corizon is now responsible to pay PMC's normal 
billing without any discount. Notwithstanding, Corizon has continued to bring prisoners to PMC 
for medical care while refusing to pay more than the Idaho Medicaid reimbursement rate for the 
medical care provided by PMC.31 
26 R. Vol. 3, p. 520. See also R. Vol. 1, p. 65 (Stipulated Memorandum). 
27 R. Vol. 1, p. 67 (Stipulated Memorandum). 





III. Course of Proceedings 
On January 20, 2016, PMC filed a complaint against Corizon in the United States District 
Court for the District of Idaho, asserting a cause of action for full payment of the HSA Rate for 
medical bills incurred prior to the expiration of the HSA Agreement on December 31, 2015. 32 On 
August 25, 2016, PMC filed an amended complaint, adding a second cause of action for full 
payment of medical bills incurred on and after January 1, 2016.33 On January 13, 2017, by stipu-
lation of the parties, the first cause of action for full payment of the HSA Rate was dismissed 
with prejudice.34 
The second cause of action remains to be adjudicated. In its defense, Corizon has relied 
upon LC. § 20-237B. Idaho Code § 20-237B(l) prohibits the "state board of correction" from 
paying "a provider of medical services" more than "the Idaho medicaid reimbursement rate" for 
medical services provided to prisoners (hereinafter "Medicaid Rate Limitation"). Idaho Code § 
20-237B(2) eliminates the Medicaid Rate Limitation under two relevant circumstances. First, the 
Medicaid Rate Limitation is eliminated if the state board of correction's payment is made to "a 
privatized correctional medical provider under contract with the department of correction to pro-
32 R. Vol. 1, pp. 1-6. 
33 R. Vol. 1, pp. 19-33. 
34 R. Vol. 1, pp. 57-59. 
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vide health care to prison inmates." LC. § 20-237B(2)(a).35 And second, the Medicaid Rate Limi-
tation is eliminated if the medical provider does not directly bill IDOC. LC. § 20-237B(2).36 
Corizon claims that the terms "state board of correction" and "department of correction" 
as used in LC. § 20-237B include privatized correctional medical providers under contract with 
IDOC. Based thereon, Corizon asserts that LC. § 20-237B prohibits it, as a privatized correction-
al medical provider, from paying more than the Idaho Medicaid reimbursement rate for medical 
services provided by PMC to prisoners in Corizon' s care. 
It is PMC's position that the terms "state board of correction" and "department of correc-
tion" as used in LC. § 20-237B do not include privatized correctional medical providers under 
contract with IDOC in light of the statutory definitions of those terms, the plain language of the 
relevant statutes, and the legislative history. It is also PMC's position that the Medicaid Rate 
Limitation does not apply, because IDOC's payment is made to Corizon as a privatized correc-
tional provider and because PMC directly bills Corizon and not IDOC. See LC.§§ 20-237B(2) & 
20-237B(2)(a). Idaho Code§ 20-237B only limits the amount IDOC may pay for inmate medical 
services that are billed directly to IDOC and does not limit what a privatized correctional medi-
cal provider like Corizon may pay for inmate medical services. Based thereon, it is PMC's posi-
35 Idaho Code § 20-237B(2)(a) eliminates the Medicaid Rate Limitation in this situation by ex-
cluding "privatized correctional medical providers under contract with the department of correc-
tion to provide health care to prison inmates" from the definition of ''provider of medical ser-
vices." 
36 Idaho Code§ 20-237B(2) eliminates the Medicaid Rate Limitation in this situation by defining 
"provider of medical services" as including "only companies, professional associations and other 
health care services entities whose services are billed directly to the department of correction." 
10 
tion that the Medicaid Rate Limitation in LC. § 20-237B does not apply under the circumstances 
of this case. 
On February 17, 2017, PMC and Corizon jointly a motion to certify the question of law 
concerning the interpretation of I. C. § 20-23 7B to the Idaho Supreme Court. 3 7 In support of the 
motion to certify, the parties jointly filed a stipulated memorandum and an affidavit of counsel.38 
On June 13, 2017, PMC and Corizon jointly filed a revised motion to certify.39 On June 30, 
2017, the United States District Court entered its order certifying the question to the Idaho Su-
preme Court.40 On August 10, 2017, the Idaho Supreme Court accepted certification and desig-
nated PMC as the Appellant and Corizon as the Respondent. 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The specific question certified by the Idaho Supreme Court is as follows: 
1. Whether, for purposes of the dispute in this lawsuit, the terms "state board of 
correction" as used in Idaho Code § 20-237B(l) and "department of correc-
tion" as used in Idaho Code § 20-237B(2), include privatized correctional 
medical providers under contract with the Idaho Department of Correction? 
37 R. Vol. 1, pp. 60-61. 
38 R. Vol. 1, pp. 63-75 (Stipulated Memorandum); Vol. 1, p. 76 to R. Vol. 3, p. 658 (Affidavit of 
Counsel with Exhibits). 
39 R. Vol. 3, pp. 659-661. 
40 R. Vol. 3, pp. 662-670. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. Certified Question 
"Courts of the United States may certify a controlling question of law in a pending action 
to the Idaho Supreme Court where there is no controlling precedent in Idaho Supreme Court de-
cisions and the determination would materially advance the orderly resolution of the litigation in 
the United States court." Doe v. BSA, 159 Idaho 103, 105, 356 P.3d 1049, 1051 (2015) (citing St. 
Luke's Magic Valley Reg'! Med Ctr. v. Luciani, 154 Idaho 37, 39-40, 293 P.3d 661, 663-64 
(2013) and I.A.R. 12.3(a)). "This Court exercises free review over questions of law." Doe v. 
BSA, 159 Idaho at 105, 356 P.3d at 1051 (citing Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 136, 90 
P.3d 884, 886 (2004)). 
II. Statutory Construction 
This Court freely reviews the construction of a statute. Gibson v. Ada Cnty., 142 Idaho 
746, 751, 133 P.3d 1211, 1216 (2006). The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over 
which this Court exercises free review. State v. Hensley, 145 Idaho 852, 855, 187 P.3d 1227, 
1230 (2008). "The statute is viewed as a whole, and the analysis begins with the language of the 
statute, which is given its plain, usual and ordinary meaning." BHC Intermountain Hosp., Inc. v. 
Ada County, 150 Idaho 93, 95, 244 P.3d 237, 239 (2010). In determining the ordinary meaning 
of the statute, "effect must be given to all the words of the statute if possible, so that none will be 
void, superfluous, or redundant." Id. (quoting State v. Mercer, 143 Idaho 108, 109, 138 P.3d 308, 
309 (2006)). However, "[i]f the language of the statute is capable of more than one reasonable 
construction it is ambiguous," and a statute that is ambiguous must be construed with legislative 
12 
intent in mind, which is ascertained by examining "not only the literal words of the statute, but 
the reasonableness of the proposed interpretations, the policy behind the statute, and its legisla-
tive history." State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 475, 163 P.3d 1183, 1187 (2007). 
ARGUMENT 
I. Idaho Code § 20-237B and the statutory definitions of the terms "state board of cor-
rection" and "department of correction" are unambiguous and do not include pri-
vatized correctional medical providers under contract with IDOC. 
Statutory construction "must begin: with the literal words of the statute, giving them their 
plain, obvious, and rational meaning; those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary 
meaning, and the statute must be construed as a whole." James v. City of Boise, 160 Idaho 466, 
485, 376 P.3d 33, 52 (2016) (internal citations omitted). "Where a statute is unambiguous, statu-
tory construction is unnecessary and courts are free to apply the plain meaning." Cowan v. Board 
of Commissioners, 143 Idaho 501, 511, 148 P.3d 1247, 1257 (2006). 
At issue is the interpretation of LC. § 20-237B, which provides in its entirety the follow-
ing with the terms at issue bolded: 
MEDICAL COSTS OF STATE PRISONERS HOUSED IN CORRECTIONAL 
FACILITIES. (1) The state board of correction shall pay to a provider of a med-
ical service for any and all prisoners, committed to the custody of the department 
of correction, confined in a correctional facility, as defined in section 18-10 lA(l ), 
Idaho Code, an amount no greater than the reimbursement rate applicable based 
on the Idaho medicaid reimbursement rate. This limitation applies to all medical 
care services provided outside the facility, including hospitalizations, professional 
services, durable and nondurable goods, prescription drugs and medications pro-
vided to any and all prisoners confined in a correctional facility, as defined in sec-
tion 18-lOlA(l), Idaho Code. For required services that are not included in the 
Idaho medicaid reimbursement schedule, the state board of correction shall pay 
the reasonable value of such service. 
13 
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) of this section, the term "provider of a 
medical service" shall include only companies, professional associations and oth-
er health care service entities whose services are billed directly to the department 
of correction. The term "provider of a medical service" shall exclude: 
(a) Privatized correctional medical providers under contract with the depart-
ment of correction to provide health care to prison inmates; 
(b) Private prison companies; 
( c) Out-of-state correctional facilities contracting with the department of cor-
rection to house prisoners; 
( d) County jails; and 
( e) Companies, professional associations and other health care service entities 
whose services are provided within the terms of agreements with privat-
ized correctional medical providers under contract with the department of 
correction, private prison companies and county jails. 
(Emphasis added). 
A statute is ambiguous only when "the meaning is so doubtful or obscure that reasonable 
minds might be uncertain or disagree as to its meaning." Farmers Nat'! Bank v. Green River 
Dairy, LLC, 155 Idaho 853, 856, 318 P.3d 622, 625 (2014) (quoting BHA Investments, Inc. v. 
City of Boise, 138 Idaho 356,358, 63 P.3d 482,484 (2003)). "[A] statute is not ambiguous mere-
ly because an astute mind can devise more than one interpretation to it." Id. 
Here, there is no uncertainty as to the meaning of the terms "department of correction" 
and "state board of correction" as used in LC. § 20-237B. These terms are statutorily defined. 
The term "state board of correction" is defined by LC. § 20-201A as "a nonpartisan board of 
three (3) members to be known as the state board of correction ... appointed by the governor to 
exercise the duties imposed by law." The term "department of correction" is defined by LC. § 
20-201 as "consist[ing] of the board of correction and the commission of pardons and parole" 
and constituting "an executive department of the state government." 
14 
These statutory definitions of the terms "department of correction" and "state board of 
correction" are unambiguous. "This court has also repeatedly recognized it to be a firmly estab-
lished rule of statutory construction that legislative definitions of terms included within the stat-
ute, control and dictate the meaning of those terms as used in the statute." Roe v. Hopper, 90 
Idaho 22, 27, 408 P.2d 161, 164 (1965).41 Because the Idaho legislature has provided these statu-
tory definitions for the terms "department of correction" and "state board of correction", they 
control the meaning of these terms within LC. § 20-237B. The statutory definitions of "state 
board of correction" and "department of correction" unambiguously do not include privatized 
correctional medical providers. The Idaho Supreme Court has "stated time and again that courts 
must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says 
there." Mayer v. TPC Holdings, Inc., 160 Idaho 223, 227, 370 P.3d 738, 742 (2016) (quoting 
Connecticut Nat'l Bankv. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992)). 
When read as a whole in the context of Title 20, Chapter 2, of the Idaho Code and relying 
upon the appropriate statutory definitions, LC. § 20-237B and the terms "state board of correc-
41 See also Mayer v. TPC Holdings, Inc., 160 Idaho 223, 226, 370 P.3d 738, 741 
(20 l 6)(11Legislative definitions of terms included within a statute control and dictate the meaning 
of those terms as used in the statute."); State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 477, 163 P.3d 1183, 
1189 (2007)("Legislative definitions of terms included within a statute control and dictate the 
meaning of those terms as used in the statute."); White v. Mock, 140 Idaho 882, 890, 104 P.3d 
356, 364 (2004)("Legislative definitions of terms included within a statute control and dictate the 
meaning of those terms as used in the statute."); Cameron v. Lakeland Class A Sch. Dist., 82 
Idaho 375, 381, 353 P.2d 652, 655 (1960)("It is a firmly established rule of statutory construc-
tion that definitions of terms included within the framework of a statute, control and dictate the 
meaning of those terms as used in the statute."). 
15 
tion" and "department of correction" are unambiguous. Although Corizon may present a "possi-
ble interpretation" different from the statutory definitions, it would not make these statutes am-
biguous. "[ A ]mbiguity is not established merely because different possible interpretations are 
presented to the court. If this were the case then all statutes that are the subject to litigation could 
be considered ambiguous." Farmers Nat'! Bank, 155 Idaho at 856, 318 P.3d at 625 (quoting 
BHA Investments, Inc., 138 Idaho at 358, 63 P.3d at 484). 
Because LC. § 20-237B and the terms "state board of correction" and "department of cor-
rection" used therein are unambiguous, "cannons of construction and legislative history are irrel-
evantto this Court's determination in this case." Farmers Nat'! Bank, 155 Idaho at 858,318 P.3d 
at 627. Because the statutory definitions unambiguously do not include privatized correctional 
medical providers, the terms "state board of correction" as used in LC. § 20-237B(l) and "de-
partment of correction" as used in Idaho Code § 20-237B(2) do not include privatized correc-
tional medical providers under contract with IDOC. 
II. Even if Idaho Code § 20-237B and the statutory definitions of the terms "state board 
of correction" and "department of correction" are considered ambiguous, cannons 
of construction and legislative history reveal that the Idaho legislature did not in-
tend for the terms "state board of correction" and "department of correction" to in-
clude privatized correctional medical providers under contract with IDOC. 
It is PMC's position that LC. § 20-237B and the statutory definitions of the terms "state 
board of correction" and ''department of correction" are unambiguous and do not include privat-
ized correctional medical providers. However, "[i]f the statute is ambiguous, then it must be con-
strued to mean what the legislature intended for it to mean." J & M Cattle Co., Ltd Liab. Co. v. 
Farmers Nat'l Bank, 156 Idaho 690, 694, 330 P.3d 1048, 1052 (2014). The Court determines 
16 
legislative intent by examining "not only the literal words of the statute, but also the reasonable-
ness of proposed constructions, the public policy behind the statute, and its legislative history." 
Id. As discussed below, this examination reveals that the Idaho legislature did not intend for the 
terms "state board of correction" and "department of correction" as used in LC. § 20-237B to 
include privatized correctional medical providers under contract with IDOC. 
A. Idaho Code § 20-237B itself differentiates between the terms "state board of cor-
rection" and "department of correction" ( on the one hand) and the term "privat-
ized correctional medical providers" ( on the other hand). 
When a statute by its own language differentiates and distinguishes two terms, the only 
reasonable conclusion is that those two terms have separate and different meanings and that one 
is not included in the definition of the other. The Idaho Supreme Court has applied this principle 
on numerous occasions. 
In State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 163 P.3d 1183 (2007),.the Idaho Supreme Court in-
terpreted LC.§ 67-2345(1), which at that time provided: ''The governing body of a public agency 
shall provide for the taking of written minutes of all meetings. Neither a full transcript nor a re-
cording of the meeting is required .... " Id. at 477, 163 P.3d at 1189. In determining whether 
"written minutes" included "recordings," the Idaho Supreme Court noted that the statute itself 
"distinguish[ed] recording from taking minutes" and therefore precluded one from being includ-
ed in the definition of the other. Id. at 477-78, 163 P.3d at 1189-90. 
In Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schrock, 150 Idaho 817, 823, 252 P.3d 98, 104 (2011), 
the Idaho Supreme Court interpreted LC. § 49-1212(6), which provided: "Any policy which 
grants the coverage required for a motor vehicle liability policy may also grant any lawful cover-
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age in excess of or in addition to the coverage specified for a motor vehicle liability policy, and 
any excess or additional coverage shall not be subject to the provisions of this chapter." Id. at 
823, 252 P.3d at 104. In determining whether the term "motor vehicle liability policy" included 
excess and supplemental policies, the Idaho Supreme Court noted that the statute itself "distin-
guishes motor vehicle liability policies from excess supplemental policies" and therefore pre-
cluded one from being included in the definition of the other. Id. 
In Safe Air For Everyone v. Idaho State Dep 't of Agric., 145 Idaho 164, 177 P.3d 378 
(2008), the Idaho Supreme Court interpreted LC. § 59-513, which provided: "The governing 
body of any county, city, or political subdivision of the state, shall supervise and regulate the de-
ferred compensation program for its employees." Id. at 167, 177 P.3d at 381. In determining 
whether the term "governing body" included "employees," the Idaho Supreme Court noted that 
the statute itself "distinguished between the 'governing body' and the 'employees"' and therefore 
precluded one from being included in the definition of the other. Id. 
The language of LC. § 20-237B clearly differentiates and distinguishes between the terms 
"state board of correction" and "department of correction" ( on the one hand) and the term "pri-
vatized correctional medical providers" (on the other hand). For example, LC. § 20-237B(2) (a) 
provides: "The term 'provider of a medical service' shall exclude ... Privatized correctional medi-
cal providers under contract with the department of correction to provide health care to prison 
inmates." (Underline added). As used in this statute, these two terms are distinguished, have dif-
fering meanings, and cannot be included in the meaning of the other. Replacement of one term 
for the other would make the statute unintelligible and negate the clear intent of the legislature. 
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"Under such circumstances the substitution of words ... would distort the definition of the 
word[ s] ... and do violence to the common understanding of the language used by the legislature." 
Roe, 90 Idaho at 27, 408 P.2d at 164. This is true for all uses throughout LC. § 20-237B of the 
terms "state board of correction" and "department of correction" ( on the one hand) and the term 
"privatized correctional medical providers'' ( on the other hand). 
Because LC. § 20-237B itself distinguishes and differentiates between the terms "state 
board of correction" and "department of correction" ( on the one hand) and the term "privatized 
correctional medical providers" ( on the other hand), the terms "board of correction" and "de-
partment of correction" as used in I.C. § 20-237B cannot include privatized correctional medical 
providers under contract with IDOC. 
B. The "billed directly" language from I.C. § 20-237B(2) indicates a clear distinc-
tion and differentiation between the "department of correction" and "privatized 
correctional medical providers." 
Idaho Code § 20-237B(2) defines the term "provider of a medical service" as including 
"only companies, professional associations and other health care service entities whose services 
are billed directly to the department of correction." (Underline added). The underlined phrase is a 
clear indication that medical providers (such as PMC) might be sending medical bills directly to 
IDOC or alternatively to a third party like a privatized correctional medical provider ( such as 
Corizon). This underlined phrase makes it clear that the Medicaid Rate Limitation from LC. § 
20-237B only applies when the medical provider is sending its bills directly to IDOC and that it 
does not apply when the bills are sent directly to a third party like a privatized correctional medi-
cal provider. 
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This underlined phrase is a legislative recognition of the difference between the "depart-
ment of correction" and a third party like a privatized correctional medical provider. If there 
were no difference, there would have been no reason for the legislature to include the underlined 
phrase in I.C. § 20-237B(2). If the term "department of correction" included privatized correc-
tional medical providers, it would render the underline phrase superfluous. "[A] statute must be 
construed so that effect is given to its provisions, and no part is rendered superfluous or insignif-
icant." Hoskins v. Howard, 132 Idaho 311, 315, 971 P.2d 1135, 1139 (1998). For this additional 
reason, a privatized correctional medical provider is not within the definition of the terms "de-
partment of correction" or "state board of correction" as used in I.C. § 20-237B. 
C. Legislative history reveals the legislature's intent to not include privatized cor-
rectional medical providers in the terms "state board of correction" and "de-
partment of correction" as used in I.C. § 20-237B. 
The legislative history clearly shows that the legislature did not intend for those terms to 
include privatized correctional medical providers. Idaho Code § 20-237B was newly enacted in 
2005. The Statement of Purpose for Idaho Code § 20-237B, as set forth in 2005 Idaho Session 
Laws 157 (S.B. 1036), provides in its entirety the following: 
The Department of Correction provides health care to inmates in accordance with 
Eighth Amendment standards that apply to health care for prisoners. Currently, 
said health care services are provided via contractual agreements with privatized 
correctional health care companies, private prison companies, county jails and en-
tities who have agreements to provide health care services to county jails. The 
contract with the privatized health care company accounts for approximately 
eighty percent of the Department's costs for inmate health care. 
The annual cost of providing health care to inmates via the contract with the pri-
vatized health care company has increased during the past four years from ap-
proximately nine million dollars to thirteen million dollars. The contract requires 
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the company to assume all financial risk for providing the required health care. 
The current contract expires September 30, 2005, and the Department will issue a 
new contract, to begin October 1, 2005. Due to the rapid increase in the cost of 
health care, it is anticipated that to obtain a similar total risk contract, the Depart-
ment's costs will be much greater than the current costs. 
To provide maximum cost-efficiency, the Department's Request for Proposal in-
cludes four options for prospective vendors to bid: 
1. Total risk to the vendor. All costs are paid by the vendor. 
2. Total risk to the vendor, with the exception of medications utilized to treat 
Hepatitis C. These medications cost approximately$ 15,000 per treatment, 
and the Department currently houses approximately 570 inmates who have 
been diagnosed with Hepatitis C. The number of inmates who will eventu-
ally qualify for treatment is unknown. 
3. Catastrophic Care cap. This option requires the vendor to pay up to $ 
50,000 for hospitalization, specialty care and off-site outpatient care per 
inmate. All costs above the cap will be paid by the Department of Correc-
tion. 
4. Aggregated can. This ootion creates a oool of funds to be used for hospi-
talizations, emergency services, and off-site care. Terms of the pool are 
negotiable, and include contributions by the vendor and the Department. 
It is anticipated that the final contract will include some form of uncontrollable fi-
nancial risk to the Department. To ameliorate the risk, the current legislation is in-
tended to limit the Department's exposure to the same level of risk assumed by 
the State of Idaho for providing health care to indigent citizens via Medicaid. 
Without this legislation, the Department's risk will be an unpredictable variable 
determined unilaterally by the respective health care providers. 
This Statement of Purpose clarifies the purpose behind the legislature's enactment of I.C. 
§ 20-237B in 2005. The legislature noted in the Statement of Purpose that the then-existing con-
tract with Corizon "require[ d] the company to assume all financial risk for providing the required 
health care" to prisoners (i.e. a total-risk contract). However, because the total-risk contract with 
Corizon was expiring, the legislature was concerned about the possibility that the new contract 
would not be a total-risk contract. The legislature "anticipated" that, under the new contract, the 
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vendor would assume only partial financial risk for prisoner health care and would require IDOC 
to pay for prisoner health care not assumed by the vendor. Not surprisingly, the legislature was 
concerned that "the Department's exposure" for any financial risk for prisoner health care not 
assumed by the vendor would be "uncontrollable" and "unpredictabl[y] variable." By enacting 
LC. § 20-237B, the legislature sought to "limit the Department's exposure" for any prisoner 
health care not assumed by the vendor under the new contract. In other words, the legislature in-
tended for the Medicaid Rate Limitation in LC. § 20-237B to apply only to medical bills that 
IDOC might be required to directly pay in the absence of a total-risk contract. 
The language of LC. § 20-237B achieves this legislative intent. Idaho Code§ 20-237B(l) 
provides: "The state board of correction shall pay to a provider of medical service ... an amount 
no greater than ... the Idaho medicaid reimbursement rate." (Underline added). Idaho Code§ 20-
237B(2) defines "provider of a medical service" as including "only companies, professional as-
sociations and other health care service entities whose services are billed directly to the depart-
ment of correction." (Underline added). If this definition and underlined phrase is placed into 
LC. § 20-237B(l), it then reads: "The state board of correction shall pay to a provider of medical 
service whose services are billed directly to the department of correction ... an amount no greater 
than ... the Idaho medicaid reimbursement rate." 
It is abundantly clear from the Statement of Purpose and the language of the statute itself 
that the Medicaid Rate Limitation was intended by the legislature to apply only to medical bills 
submitted directly to and paid directly by IDOC in the absence of a total-risk contract. There is 
no other reasonable interpretation of the Statement of Purpose and the statute itself. 
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Notably, the legislature's concern in 2005 that IDOC would be unable to obtain a full-
risk contract did not occur. IDOC's contracts with Corizon entered in 2005 (effective October 1, 
2005) and later in 2013 (effective January 1, 2014) were both full-risk contracts pursuant to 
which Corizon agreed to accept the full financial risk and responsibility for all prisoner health 
care. Since the enactment of LC. § 20-237B, all medical bills for prisoner health care rendered by 
providers such as PMC have been billed directly to and paid directly by Corizon.42 Since the en-
actment of LC. § 20-237B, medical bills have not been sent directly to or paid directly by 
IDOC.43 The Medicaid Rate Limitation has had no legal application since the enactment of LC. § 
20-237B in 2005, because IDOC has not yet been exposed to paying medical bills not assumed 
by a privatized correctional medical provider. (This might explain why Corizon did not attempt 
limit its payments to the Medicaid Rate Limitation for the first nine (9) years after the enactment 
of LC.§ 20-237B in 2005.) 
The legislative history for LC. § 20-237B, as expressed in its Statement of Purpose, clear-
ly indicates that the legislature intended for the Medicaid Rate Limitation to apply only to medi-
cal bills that IDOC might have to directly pay if the health care vendor did not accept a total-risk 
contract. Construing the terms "state board of correction" and "department of correction" as in-
cluding privatized correctional medical providers for purposes of I.C. § 20-237B would improp-
42 R. Vol. 1, p. 67 (Stipulated Memorandum: "PMC bills Corizon for medical care rendered to 
those prisoners."). See also R. Vol. 1, p. 65 (Stipulated Memorandum: "Corizon agreed to 'be 
responsible for all medical claims'" ... and to be 'financially responsible for claims from subcon-
tractors or other providers for services provided ... "' and to "make '[a]ll payments to medical 
.d '") prov1 ers... . 
43 Id. 
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erly expand the applicability of the Medicaid Rate Limitation far beyond and in contradiction of 
the legislative intent. For this additional reason, the term "state board of correction" as used in 
I.C. § 20-237B(l) and "department of correction" as used in LC. § 20-237B(2) do not include 
privatized correctional medical providers under contract with IDOC. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons discussed above, it is respectfully requested that the Idaho Supreme Court 
answer the certified question of law by holding that that terms "state board of correction" as used 
in LC. § 20-237B(l) and "department of correction" as used in LC. § 20-237B(2) do not include 
privatized correctional medical providers under contract with IDOC. 
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